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INTRODUCTION

'The appendix of forms accompanying the rules illustrates how simply a claim
may be pleaded and with how few factual averments. " 1

The Appendix of Forms that, from the time of their adoption have accompanied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are a seeming anachronism, more
appropriate for a much simpler time that hardly characterizes modem day fed
eral civil litigation. Perhaps the form for a negligence complaint is the most
striking in this regard, offering only that at a certain time and place "the de
fendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff," causing harm. 2
Not only does such a complaint fail to typify the negligence claims one might
find on any federal docket, but it also fails to reflect the much greater com
plexity that characterizes modem litigation and life in general.
What, then, could be the continuing point of having the forms at all? In
deed, that is the question the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("Advisory
Committee") has asked and answered quite recently: it has concluded that the
3
Official Forms no longer serve any useful purpose and may therefore be dis
carded into the waste bin of history. Seemingly without much further thought,
the Standing Committee promptly concurred,4 as did the Judicial Conference, 5
and the U.S. Supreme Court.6
Might it be true that the forms have outlived their usefulness? And if no
longer of any use, were the forms ever of any real utility? On the occasion of
the abrogation of the Official Forms, this article takes the opportunity to review
the history and use of the forms, finding that they had more value than the cur
rent mlemakers cared to acknowledge: The principal function of the forms was
to reify the liberal vision of the Federal Rules and to guard against deviations
therefrom. Unfortunately, as that liberal vision has given way to a more restric
tive view7 in what Stephen Subrin refers to as the "fourth era" of civil proce1

Sparks v. Englarid, 113 F.2d 579, 5 81 (8th Cir. 1940).
FED. R. Crv. P. Form 11.
3 See Proposed Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 84, Committee Note ("The purpose of
providing illustrations for the rules, although useful when the rules were adopted, has been
fulfilled . . . . Accordingly, . . . Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no longer necessary.
. . . ").
4
Patricia W. Moore, Standing Committee Approves Proposed FRCP Amendments, Crv.
PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (June 7, 2014), http://lawprofessors. typepad.com/civpro/2014/06
/stariding-committee-approves-proposed-frcp-amendments.html ("The Standing Committee
met on May 29-30, 2014 in D.C. and unariimously approved the amendments as they were
modified by the Advisory Committee at its meeting in April. ").
5 The Judicial Conference approved the proposed amendments on September 16, 2014, for
warding them to the Supreme Court for its consideration.
6 See Order Approving Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, H.R. Doc. No.
114-33 (2015).
7 See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 7 8 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 353, 353-54 (2010) (explaining that "a 'restrictive ethos' prevails in procedure today,
with mariy rules being developed, interpreted, arid applied in a mamier that frustrates the
2
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dure,8 the unyielding simplicity and permissiveness of the forms became too
much for the otherwise changing system to bear. Below, then, is a eulogy of the
forms.9
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 84 AND THE OFFICIAL FORMS
A. Origins
Appending forms to rules of court was a common practice at the time the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted. The practice of including
exemplary forms appears to have been a legacy of period when the legal system
was characterized by the forms of action, which, in their day, required rigid and
precise formulations of a claim in a writ from the Crown to gain access to the
legal system and obtain a remedy.10 For example, the writ of right-which was
the writ used by a tenant (call him "A") who claimed that another (call him
"B") was in wrongful possession of land-would be addressed by the king to
the landowner (call him "C") in the following form:
I command you that without delay you hold full right to A ... concerning a
virgate of land in Middleton which he claims to hold of you by such and such
free service, and unless you do it my sheriff of Northamptonshire shall do it, that
I may hear no further complaint about this matter for default of justice."
A tenant out of possession had to obtain such a writ and seek relief from
his immediate lord or the judges of his lord's feudal court.12 However, if the
claimant to the property purported to be the owner of the land and not a mere
tenant, the writ of right would have been inappropriate. Instead, the owner
referred to as a "tenant in chief' because he claimed the land directly from the
king-would need a different writ, referred to as a Praecipe quad reddat,
which employed the following language:
Command B that justly and without delay he render to A a hide of land in
Middleton, whereof A complains that B unjustly deforces him, and if he will not

ability of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on tlle merits in federal
court").
8
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era ofAmerican Civil Procedure, 162
U.PA.L.REV. 1839 (2014).
9
I use tlle term eulogy only to signify tlle impending elimination of the forms.At tlle time
oftlris writing, Congress had yet to weigh in on tlle matter (tlris piece may be published after
the time for tllem to do so expires); however, tllere is no prospect tllat Congress will inter
vene to block tlleir abrogation.
10
F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALso THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 314 (A. H.
Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1909) ("From time to time he [the king] interferes witll ordi
nary litigation; at the instance of a litigant he issues a writ commanding a feudal lord or a
sheriff to dojustice . . ..").
11
Id. at 317.
12
See id. at 307.
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do it, summon him that he be before my justices at such a place and time to an
swer why he has not done it.13
Use of the wrong writ meant that the defendant was not obliged to respond,
which would prevent the claimant from receiving any relief.1 4 Thus, it was im
portant that the proper form be used for the writ when commencing an action.
Given their significance, it was beneficial for the proper formulations for
the various forms of action to be documented and compiled for use by lawyers
representing persons with various claims. This was done quite early in English
legal history by Ranulf de Glanvill, the "Chief Justiciar" (roughly akin to a
prime minister) of England during the reign of King Henry 11.1 5 Circa 1188,
Glanvill produced the first treatise on the laws of England.1 6 This work includ
ed an explanation of the then extant legal process and systematic reference to
the writs available at that time for a wide variety of circumstances, from a ten
ant in wrongful possession of land 1 7 to disputes over proper entitlement to a
church.1 8
Much later, we see extensive compilations of forms illustrating how to
plead certain actions. For example, the widely used and highly regarded nine
teenth century Treatise on Pleading by Joseph Chitty contained an entire vol
ume of forms that ser ved as a compendium of pleading examples covering eve
ry conceivable type of claim or request that needed to be presented to a court.1 9
Reviewing Chitty's forms reveals detailed fill-in-the-blank forms for matters as
diverse as "Writ of Entry to recover the Possession of Land,"20 "Declarations in
Action Removed from Inferior Courts,"2 1 "Commencement of a Plea in Bar,"22
and "Action to recover a Penalty of £100 for bribing a Voter at a Parliamentary
Election."23 By the 1930s when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were un
der development, the practice guides for many American states as well as for
England included an appendix of forms spelling out how to state the myriad
.
.
c1aims one m1ght assert.M
13
14

Id. at 317.
Id. at 315 ("There is good reason to believe that Henry, in some ordinance lost to us, laid

down the broad principle that no man need answer for his freehold without royal writ. Every
one therefore who demands freehold land must obtain a writ; otherwise his adversary will
not be bound to answer him.").
15
F.W.MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 13 (1908).
16
RANULF DE GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGN! ANGLIAE (ca.
1188).
17
See id. at 5.
18
See id. at 80.
19
See 2 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY'S TREATISE ON PLEADING (16th American ed. 1879).
20
Id. at 118.
21
Id. at 6.
22
Id. at 19.
23
Id. at 92.
24
See, e. g., EnglishAnnual Practice (1937)Appendix A to M inclusive; 2 Mass. Gen. Laws
(Ter. Ed., 1932) ch. 231, § 147, Forms 1-47; Conn.Practice Book (1934) Rules, 47-68, pp.
123-427.
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Thus, it is not surprising that the drafters of the Federal Rules would follow
suit by appending official forms to their work. This was achieved through a rule
that referenced the forms, coupled with an Appendix containing the forms.
What ultimately became Rule 84 initially appeared as Rule 86 and read as fol
lows:
Rule 86. Use of Forms. The forms attached to these rules in the Appendix of
Forms, with appropriate changes as circumstances may require, shall be consid
ered sufficient under these rules. 25
By November of 1937, proposed Rule 86 had been revised substantially:
Rule 86. Forms. The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are intended to
indicate, subject to the provisions of these rules, the simplicity and brevity of
statement which the rules contemplate. 26
The note accompanying this revision explained that "[t]his change is to make it
clear that the rules control the forms, and that the forms do not supersede the
27
rules. " In presenting the forms, the Committee led with an "Introductory
Statement " that announced, "The following forms are intended for illustration
only. They are limited in number. No attempt is made to furnish a manual of
29
28
forms. " This limitation-there were only twenty-seven forms -was an in
novation, as predecessor form compilations on which the Official Forms in the
Federal Rules were based were voluminous and seemingly comprehensive. 30
Turning to the original Official Forms themselves, their content reflects
their lineage in the predecessor forms discussed above. When one consults
Chitty's treatise and flips to the form for a complaint "Against the Owner of a
Carriage for negligent driving, " one finds the following allegation:
For that the defendant . . . so negligently drove his horse and carriage, that the
same struck against the carriage and horse of the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff
was hurt and prevented from following his business, and incurred expense in en
deavoring to be cured. 31

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 215 (Apr. 1937).
FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (Nov.
1937).
27
Id. at 56.
28
FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006).
29
That the forms were limited rather than comprehensive seemed to be lamentable to some,
at least to the extent they left certain concepts within the Rules unilluminated. For example,
in 1943 a proponent of having greater guidance regarding the grounds that could support a
new trial motion under Rule 59 felt that because articulating all of the grounds would prove
too difficult, the Official Forms could be enlisted to do the job: "I am inclined to believe that
instead of attempting such an amendment, it would be better if illustrative forms of a motion
for a new trial in a jury and in a non-jury case could be added to the Appendix of Forms."
Open Forum: Practice and Procedure, 10 INS. COUNSEL J. 33, 37 (1943).
3
° For example, the forms appended to Connecticut's 1934 mies of practice were 680 in
number. THE CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK OF 1934 (1934).
31
CHITTY, supra note 19, at 574-75.
25
26
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The resonance of this form from Chitty with the form for a complaint for negli
gence in the 193 8 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which alleged that "de
fendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff' and was thus "in
jured [and] was prevented from transacting his business" 32-is not coincidental.
Charles Clark, the reporter to the first Advisory Committee, revealed that origi
nal Form 9 was "copied directly from the official form in Massachusetts. ... It
in tum is copied directly from Chitty and is the common law form of the action
of trespass on the case." 33 Clark also acknowledged that other forms were di
rect descendants of the common law forms: "Forms 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are devel
oped directly from the common law forms in the action of general assumpsit." 34
B. Purpose

Although the forms trace their lineage to the common law forms used by
the states and in England, the purpose of including the forms along with the
new Federal Rules was not to perpetuate formalistic pleading but quite the op
posite-to buttress the new vision of pleading espoused by the drafters of the
rules. By now we should be quite familiar with the deliberate objective of the
original Advisory Committee to eliminate the fact pleading that was prevalent
in the codes at the time and move towards a simplified general form of plead
ing. 35 Charles Clark explained the rationale behind the abandonment of fact
pleading on many occasions. During the road show presenting the rules to
members of the American Bar Association in Cleveland, Ohio, Clark remarked:
I think that the idea that you can pin another fellow down by the pleadings so
that he can not escape from it is just a dream that never was successful any
where, and that the courts have wasted more time over the years in trying to per-

32

FED.R. CIV.P.Form 9 (1938).
See RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 222-23 (William W.
Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS]; see also 2 Mass. Gen.
Laws (Ter. Ed., 1932) ch. 231, § 147, Form 13 C[T]he defendant so negligently and unskilfully [sic] drove a motor vehicle in a public highway, called _ _ _
_ street, in Boston,
that by reason thereof the said motor vehicle struck the plaintiff ....").
34
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT
WASHINGTON, D.C., AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 43 (Edward H. Hanunond
ed., 1938) [hereinafter WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS]; see also Ralph C.
Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 ARK.L. REV. 1, 24 (1952-1953) ("Here will be
seen evidence of the Federal Rules as lineal descendants of common law pleading for some
of the forms are clearly taken from common law declarations in assumpsit and trespass on
the case."); CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33 at 227 ("Some of you who
may have felt we are getting a little too far away from the common law ought to feel rather
better by this, since it shows that ... in the most ordinary, simple cases-contracts, debts
and negligence-are based ...on the common law forms, which have been found useful and
...adequate for years.").
35
CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33, at 220 ("These pleadings do call for
what we should fairly term rather general pleadings.").
33
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feet allegations which make narrow issues than any possible gain can ever be
worth. 36
To back up this goal, the drafters offered the forms as illustrations of the sim
plified pleading that they contemplated more so than as documents intended for
actual use in pleading. Clark described the forms early on as "examples of pro
37
cedure to be followed " but "not . . . a lawyer's manual or form book. " He lat
er remarked,
Those forms are not intended to be a desk manual so that whenever you have a
case you won't have to do any thinking about it. . . . That is not the purpose. The
purpose is to illustrate the rules. These are the pictures that we hope will make
the rules alive to you.38
Given the predecessor fact-pleading regime to which many contemporary
practitioners were accustomed, some were not enamored with forms that
seemed over-simplified and devoid of facts. In response to the argument that
the statement contained in Form 9 (the negligence complaint) was too thin,
Clark defended the sufficiency of its simplicity when he stated,
[I]f you are not looking for admissions or for something that will take the place
of proof, if you are looking for a general statement which will send the case
through the proper channels of the court and eventually provide for res adjudi
cate, how could you ask for anything more? You have the case here differentiat
ed from all other situations giving rise to legal relations requiring court action. It
is the case of the pedestrian-automobile accident.39
Elaborating on the same theme at a New York symposium on the new rules,
Clark expanded:
[A]n allegation which says simply that the defendant did injure the plaintiff
through his negligence is too general and would not stand, for really that tells
you no differentiating features about the case whatsoever . . . while on the other
hand . . . the statement of the act in question in a general way, and with the char
acterization that it is negligent, is sufficient. That is the allegation in this form
(Form 9). Here, instead of saying defendant's negligence caused the injury, you
say that the defendant negligently drove his automobile against the plaintiff,
who was then crossing the street, and you have then the case isolated from every
other kind of case of the same character, really from every other case . . . . At the
pleading stage, in advance of the evidence, before the parties know how the case
is going to shape up, that is all, in all fairness, you can require. 40
For Clark-and presumably for the other drafters as well-the pleadings
were not intended to serve additional functions beyond informing the defendant

36

Id. at 220.

Charles E. Clark, Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 AB.A J. 447, 451 &
n.43 (1936).
38
WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 42.
39
Id. at 44.
40
Id. at 241.
37
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of the nature of the action and distinguishing it from others.4 1 Obtaining further
information was the office of the discovery devices the drafters created:
[J]ust send around a series of questions to your opponent and ask him to answer
them, and he is expected to do it. That isn't part of the pleading; that is Deposi
tion and Discovery, and is mainly there for the purpose of giving you infor
mation to prepare your case.... That is the way to clear up points of dispute, not
by the pleadings proper.42
Thus, we see a clear intention that the Official Forms be regarded as the examples of the new simplified pleading regime, a message the drafters felt would
not be sufficiently clear or embraced were lawyers left to the guidance of the
rules alone.
11. EARLY EXPERIENCE UNDER THE FORMS

A. Early Invocations of the Fonns

From the beginning of the life of the Federal Rules, we see the forms ful
filling the function envisioned by the drafters, as they were invoked by courts
and litigants on many occasions to confirm that the new rules did not require
particularized pleading in the ordinary case. For example, in Sierocinski v. E.I.
3
Du Pont de Nemours & Co.4 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negli
gent in manufacturing a dynamite cap but did not specify what actions of the
manufacturer were negligent in particular. As a result, the district court granted
the defendant's "motion to strike" the complaint because it failed to set forth
any specific act of negligence.44 The Third Circuit reversed, citing Form 9 as
supporting the notion that a general allegation of negligence sufficed, and add
ed, "[i]f defendant needs further information to prepare its defense it can obtain
it by interrogatories."45 Similarly, in Sparks v. England,46 a defendant com
plaining that the plaintiff had failed to plead specific facts showing that the al
leged tort was "willful" was rebuffed by the court with a reference the Official
Forms:
The Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a plaintiff shall plead eve
ry fact essential to his right to recover the amount which he claims. The re
quirement is, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief," and "a demand for judgment for the relief to which he
deems himself entitled." The appendix of forms accompanying the rules illusCharles E. Clark, Summary Judgments, 2 F.R.D. 364, 366 (1941) ("The essence of mod
em pleading is the generalized form of statement which gives fair notice of opposing claims,
but avoids the detailed particularization of the old special pleading . . . . Hence the trend is to
such simple forms of allegation and denial as are shown by the forms attached to the new
federal rules . . . .").
42
WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 42.
43
Sierocinski v.E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1939).
44
Id. at 843.
45
Id. at 844.
46
Sparks v.England, 113 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1940).
41
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trates how simply a claim may be pleaded and with how few factual aver
ments.47
48
Other courts were in accord with this view. Commentators of the day, too,
regularly invoked the forms to support the assertion that fact pleading had been
slayed by the new Federal Rules.49 Clark himself would continue to reiterate
this point as well, writing that the abandonment of code pleading's emphasis on
pleading facts "is shown more clearly in the federal Appendix of Forms."50
Although the Official Forms were intended to illustrate the drafters' vision,
early understanding of the forms was that they also were sufficient if used.51 In
5
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen, 2 a New York court rejected
a challenge to the sufficiency of a jurisdictional allegation because the plaintiff
had simply invoked the language found in Form 2-"the matter in controversy
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000."53 Specifi
cally, the court wrote, "[t]his is sufficient under Rule 84.... Jurisdiction is suf
54
ficiently alleged if Form 2 in the Appendix of Forms is followed." The court
55
in Corcoran v. Royal Development Co. similarly acknowledged the sufficien
cy of the forms: "The complaint alleges: 'Third: The matter in controversy ex
ceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Three thousand ($3,000.00)
Dollars.' This allegation standing alone is all that the pleader need allege. See
Form 2."56 One court went as far as to strike specific allegations of negligence
because under "the New Rules" and Form 9, "a mere general charge of negli
gence is sufficient" and thus "the allegations contained in the third paragraph of
the petition have now no place therein."57 Although this approach would be at
odds with the generally accepted view that the forms were not mandatory, it
confirms the contemporaneous treatment of the Official Forms as more than
hortatory.
47
48

Id. at 581 (citations omi tted).
See, e. g., Swift & Co. v.Young, 107 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir. 1939) (citing then-Form 9 to

beat back a pleading sufficiency challenge).
See, e. g. , MarlynE. Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 53
W. V A. L. REv. 195, 251 (1951) ("The official forms in the appendix to the Federal Rules
indicate that the rule requiring one to plead according to the legal effect has been abolished
and that those rules require no verbalism to state a claim."); Walter G. Schwartz, Comment,
Negligence Pleading: Alleging Defendant 's Breach of Duty, 35 CAL. L. REV. 267, 268
(1947) C[A] s against a general demurrer . . . it is sufficient to allege that the defendant neg
ligently did some act, without specifying the exact means or manner. California cases and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in accord.") (citing then-Form 9, now Form 11).
5
° Charles E. Clark, Book Review, 62 YALE L.J. 292, 296 (1953).
51
See, e. g. , The Official Forms, 4 FED.R. SERV. 954, 954 (1941) ("Nevertheless, the forms
should normally be considered sufficient as against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.").
52
Connecticut Gen.Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 27 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
53
Id. at 736.
49

54
55
56
57

Id.

Corcoran v.Royal Dev. Co., 35 F. Supp. 400 (E.D.N.Y 1940).

Id. at 401.

Hardin v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 97, 97 (S.D. Ohio 1939).
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Although a major function of the forms was to disabuse obser vers of the
notion that the fact pleading of old sur vived the advent of the Federal Rules,
they also illuminated the nature of practice under the new rules in other ways.
For example, one question raised early on was whether the proper motion in
response to a defective summons or an insufficient ser vice of process was a
motion to quash or a motion to dismiss-the term "motion to quash" did not
appear in the Rules but was theretofore the typical method of responding to a
deficient ser vice of process. Although one court concluded "[u]nder the new
Rules of Civil Procedure ... the motion to dismiss on the ground of insuffi
ciency of process is the proper procedure,"58 one commentator at the time
pointed out that Form 19 contemplated the use of a motion to quash. Form 19
then read:
To dismiss the action or in lieu thereof to quash the return of service of sum
mons on the grounds (a) that the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of Delaware and was not and is not subject to service of process within the
Southern District of New York, and (b) that the defendant has not been properly
served with process in this action.59
The commentator thus concluded that the motion to quash remained available
under the new rules. To cite another example, in support of his view that it was
permissible to have "speaking motions" that included facts in support of a mo
tion, original Advisory Committee member Edson Sunderland wrote, "[i]t is
obviously contemplated that facts may be set forth as grounds of the motions
6
presenting most of these [Rule 12] defenses" and cited Form 19 as support. 0
B.

Challenges to the New Regime

Notwithstanding the clear message of the drafters regarding their intent to
depart from the formalized pleading under the codes-as illustrated by the Of
ficial Forms-resistance to liberal pleading remained. Although, as just dis
cussed, the forms were invoked in response to such resistance, it appears their
illustrative-rather than authoritative-status provided some courts with a basis
for disregarding them. Several facts demonstrated that the forms could be re
garded as merely illustrative. Recall that Charles Clark stated that the forms did
not provide a manual but rather "[t]he purpose is to illustrate the rules."6 1 Fur
ther, the "Introductory Statement" that appeared before the forms read, "The

Smi t h v.Belmore, 1 F.R.D. 633, 634 (E.D.Wash. 1941).
Claude H. Brown, Some Problems Concerning Motions Under Federal Rule 12(b), 27
MINN.L.REV. 415, 417 (1943) (quoting Form 19).
60
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, JUDICIALADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND
JURISDICTION OF COURTS 878 n.88 (2d ed. 1948).
61
WASHINGTON & NEW Y ORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 42; see also JAM ES
WILLIAM MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW
FEDERAL RULES § 84.01 (1938) ("They are limited in number . . . and, therefore, are mainly
illustrative.").
58

59
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following forms are intended for illustration only."62 Finally, a prior version of
Rule 84 that would have provided that the forms "shall be considered sufficient
under these rules" was rejected in favor of the version of Rule 84 that ultimate
ly was promulgate, pronouncing the rules as indicative rather than sufficient.63
Two early decisions were notable for their espousal of the "merely illustra
tive" view. In Washburn v. Moorman Manufacturing Co.,64 a California court
rejected the plaintiff's use of one of the Official Forms by stating, "[t]hese
forms are merely to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the
rules contemplate.... In the instant case no fact is stated to support the conclu
65
sion of 'implied contract' to pay." More dramatic, perhaps, was the court's
rejection of the sufficiency of the forms in Employers ' Mutual Liability Insur
ance Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co.:
It is contended, however, by the plaintiff that its complaint is in substantial com
pliance with the form prescribed by the Supreme Court in adopting the New
Rules of Civil Procedure. An examination of the form supports plaintiff in its
contention. However, these forms do not dispense with the necessity, as occa
sion may require, for a statement of certain details or particulars which would
enable the defendant more readily to prepare and file a responsive pleading.66
The response to these cases was a 1946 proposal to amend Rule 84 to make
explicit what the preponderance of courts had already recognized: that the Offi
cial Forms were sufficient and could be relied upon if used to withstand chal
lenge. This was achieved by amending Rule 84 to read as follows:
The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and
are intended to indicate, slffijeet to the pro,,cisioH:s of these mies, the simplicity
and brevity of statement which these rules contemplate.67
Thus, the 1946 amendment resurrected the abandoned language from the April
1937 proposed Rule 86, retaining the last clause added in November of that
same year. More than that, the amendment deleted the language subjecting the
forms "to the provisions of these rules," a move that placed them on par with
the Rules themselves rather than subordinate to them.68 The note accompanying
this change explained that the change was made "to discourage isolated results
FED.R.CIV.P.Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006).
FED.R.CIV.P. 86 (Apr. 1937 draft).
64
Washburn v.Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
65
Id. at 546.
66
Employers' Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Blue Line Transfer Co., 2 F.R.D. 121, 123 (W.D.
Mo. 1941).
67
A DVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES F OR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 118 ( June 1946).
68
Some members of the bar were not supportive of this change. See, e. g., First Report of
62
63

Special Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Regarding Draft of Proposed Amend
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 J.B.Ass'N D.C. 439, 450 (1944) C[I] t is

deemed unwise to bind a court in advance to any crystallized form of pleading which may or
may not fi t the particular claim to which it is sought to be applied.").
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such as those found in Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co. [and] Employers Mutu
69
al Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co., " the cases dis
cussed above. Although the amendment neglected to revise the Introductory
70
Statement that seemed to limit the forms to illustrative status, the revised lan
71
guage of Rule 84 left no doubt about the matter.
Never theless, resistance to liberal pleading endured in many quar ters
something that the Supreme Cour t stepped in to address in its 195 7 decision in
Conley v. Gibson. 72 Rejecting the defendants' asser tion that the plaintiffs were
obliged to plead the facts underlying their discrimination claims, the Cour t
wrote,
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set for th specific
facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismiss al is
therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Feder al Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim. To the cont rary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain state
ment of the claim " that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illust rative forms appended to
the Rules plainly demonst rate this.73
Contemporaneous academic commentary echoed the connection between the
forms and the looser approach to pleading sanctioned under the Rules and af
74
firmed by Conley. Indeed, the great Jack Weinstein valori zed the Official
Forms not too long after this time when he noted that practice under the 1962
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ( " C PLR ") would have been enhanced
by preparation of an official set of forms to avoid the inevitable pleading dis
75
putes that would arise under those mles.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supranote 67, at 119.
MOORE'S FEDERAL RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS 176 (1947).
7 1 At the same time Rule 84 was amended as described, Rule 12 (e) was amended to elimi 
nate the motion for a bill of particulars, a device whose existence was in tension both with
the libe ral pleading standard of Rule 8 (a) and the provision for e xpansive discovery in the
Fede ral Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (e), 1946 Advisory Co mmittee Note.
72
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 (1957).
73
Id. at 47.
74
See, e. g. , Robert Kovach, Problems of Plaintiff in Pleading Negligence, 23 Omo ST. L.J.
435, 449 (1962) (citing the forms as conf ir mation that the Rules approve of pleading negli 
gence in the style per mitted under the common law) ; Roy F. Shields, Proceedings of the
69

70

Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges: Advantages to a Trial Lawyer of a
Pre-Trial Conference, 23 F.R.D. 319, 344 (1958) ("While I find no authority for notice

pleadings in the body of the Fede ral Rules, there is support for them in the Appendix of
Forms, 28 U. S.C.A. For example, Form 4 indicates t hat in an action on an account the com 
plaint need allege only that 'defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars according to the
account hereto annexed as Exhibit A' ") ; Note, The Admission in Evidence of Pleadings Un
der the Codes and Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 98, 107
(1957) ( "Examples annexed to the rules make clear t hat conside rably less detail is re quired
than in code jurisdictions. Emp hasis is on the giving of notice, supplement ary discovery pro 
cedures being available for explo ration of fact.").
75
Jack B. Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1439-40 (1962)
( "Much of the d ifficulty wi th pleading in New York could be avoided if an appendix of
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III. THE FORMS IN MODERN TIMES

Since the 1960s through the present, the Official Forms have been used in
ways similar to how they have been used from the beginning: as a source of in
structional guidance for how to plead both ordinary and special claims like
fraud and patent claims, as well as the pleading of jurisdiction and other mat
ters. Below is a brief sampling of the more recent judicial output on this score.
A. Stating an Ordinary Claim

The Supreme Court's most recent invocation of the forms was in
6
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,7 in which it rebuffed an attempt to require the plain
tiff to plead additional facts supporting his claim of age and national origin dis
crimination by citing to the "simple requirements of Rule 8(a)."77 In the Court's
words, these "simple" requirements "are exemplified by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Forms, which 'are sufficient under the rules and are intended to
indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contem
plate.' "78 Justice Stevens cited to the forms in his dissent in Bell Atlantic Corp.
9
v. Twombl/ as a basis for opposing the majority's reading of a fact-pleading
"plausibility" requirement into Rule 8(a); he wrote, "The pleading paradigm
under the new Federal Rules was well illustrated by the inclusion in the appen
dix of Form 9, a complaint for negligence," which clearly permits what "would
have been called a 'conclusion of law' under the code pleading of old."80 Low
er courts have done what the Swierkiewicz court did with Form 9 (now Form
11)-deploy it to push back against urgings to impose fact-pleading require
ments on plaintiffs.8 1 Obviously, the Supreme Court itself has not embraced
forms were promulgated by the Judicial Conference. This would follow the helpful practice
in England, the federal courts, Connecticut, and other jurisdictions. While the legislature
struck out of the CPLR all references to official forms, it was understood that there was no
objection to preparation of an official set of forms. Standard, simple forms in pleading as
well as other areas could greatly reduce the burden of paper work now weighing down law
yers, judges, and clerks. "); see also Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on
Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 51 8, 523 (1957) ("An ap
pendix of forms can be utilized to clarify the rules and to illustrate the specifici ty and sim
plici ty desired. ").
76
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
77 Id. at 513.
78 Id. at 513 n.4 (quoting Rule 84).
79
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
80 Id. at 575-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 See, e. g. , Ruffin v. Nicely, 1 83 Fed. App'x 505, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) ("In light of
Swierkiewicz and Form 9, Rnffin need not allege all elements of or all facts necessary for a
prima facie claim under any of his theories of relief. "). The court in In re Initial Public Of
fering Securities Litigation, did a particularly nice job of articulating the form-based argu
ment against a requirement of heightened fact pleading:
Rule 8(a) does not require plaintiffs to plead the legal theory, facts or elements underlying
their claim. There is nothing in Form 9, for example, to support plaintiff's accusation of negli
gence. "It does not say, for example, whether the hypothetical defendant was speeding, driving
without lights, or driving on the wrong side of the road." Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73
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such a use of the forms given its revised approach to pleading in Twombly and
82
Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Indeed, the Advisory Commit tee on Civil Rules has cited
the tension between Twombly and Iqbal on the one hand and the Official Forms
8
on the other as one justification for abolishing the forms. 3
B. Pleading Special Claims
I.

Fraud Allegations

From the beginning, the Federal Rules have made special provision for the
pleading of fraud allegations, re quiring that "the circumstances constituting
84
fraud or mistake shall be stated with par ticularity. " What such par ticularity
entailed has similarly been illustrated in the Official Forms since the inception
of the Federal Rules in Form 13: " Defendant C. D. on or about . . . . conveyed
all of his property, real and personal [or specify and describe] to defendant E.F.
for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff. "85 Thus, cour ts took to citing Form 13
to reject asser tions that fraud claims were insufficiently pleaded. For example,
86
in Powell, Inc. v. Abney, a Texas cour t used Form 13 in this way:
Union Carbide next contends that the Plaintiff's third-p arty complaint
should be stricken for failure to aver the circumstances of fraud with p articul ari
ty as required by Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b), however, must be read in conjunction
with the Rule 8(a), which merely requires "a short and plain statement of the
claim." Indeed, Official Form 1 3 of the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure cle arly
illust rates that the feder al rules merely require notice pleading. 87
88

In In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, another cour t did the same, re
jecting the defendants' challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs common
law fraud, securities fraud, and RI C O claims by stating, " Rule 9(b) does not re
89
quire detailed fact pleading of claims of fraud, " citing Form 13. In 1991 we
find an example of the invocation of Form 13 in a New York federal cour t:
[I]n a motion under Rule 9(b) "it is inappropriate to focus exclusively on the fact
that Rule 9(b) requires p articularity in pleading fraud." Rather, a court must
F.3d 418, 423 (D.C.Cir. 1996). Nor does it outline the four elements of negligence and explain
how each is satisfied. "Form 9 thus treats the mere allegation of negligence as sufficient." Id.
(emphasis added). Form 9's allegations are wholly conclusory: by simply describing the claim in
a short and plain fashion, Form 9 satisfies the Federal Rules. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 84.

In re Initial Pub. Offe ring Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 323 ( S.D.N.Y. 2003).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662 (2009).
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PREL IMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (Aug. 2013) C[T]he pleading forms live in tension
with recently developing approaches to general pleading standards.").
84
FED. R. CIV. P. 9 ( b) (1938).
85
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 13 (1938) (alte ration in o riginal).
86
Powell, Inc. v. Abney, 83 F.R.D. 482 ( S.D. Tex. 1979).
87
Id. at 487 (citations o mitted).
88
In re Longho rn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255 ( W.D. Okla. 1983).
89
Id. at 263.
82

83
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strike a "balance between the simplicity sought in Rule 8 and the particularity
required by Rule 9." An example of this balance "is demonstrated by the illus
trative fraud claim set out in Official Form 1 3 , which is expressly declared to be
a sufficient pleading by Rule 84." An examination of the complaint reveals that
the plaintiff closely followed Form 1 3 in preparing the complaint. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the complaint, as presently drawn, satisfies the requirements
0
of Rule 9(b).9
Many other instances of the same usage of Form 13 could be cited; a few addi
1
tional such cases are referenced in the margin.9
After the 2007 restyling of the Federal Rules, Form 13 became Form 2 1 .
What i s interesting i s that the form continued to b e cited in support of the min
imal burden associated with fraud pleading, notwithstanding the fact that the
Twombly and Iqbal decisions moved the ordinary pleading standard away from
its notice pleading roots. For example, in 20 1 1 the federal court in Minnesota
wrote, "[i]f the somewhat bare-bones assertions in Form 2 1 suffice to plead a
fraudulent-conveyance claim, then the Complaint here must similarly pass mus
ter. And Twombly and Iqbal do not (and cannot) change that result."92 Other
3
courts continued to cite Form 2 1 post- Twiqbal as well.9 However, such a view
94
of Form 2 1 was not unanimous; Kelleher v. Kelleher is illustrative here:
Plaintiff raises the argument that her fraudulent transfer claims are proper
because they comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Form 21. Form 2 1 , which is contained in the Appendix of Forms attached to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires Plaintiff merely to identify the under
lying debt and the allegedly fraudulent transfer. However, the Court does not
agree that Form 2 1 obviates the heightened pleading requirements for fraud un-

90 United States v. Gelb, 7 83 F. Supp. 74 8, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 129 8, at
621, 623, 624).
91
See, e. g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 12 8 F.3d 1074, 1079 (7th
Cir. 1997) (citing Form 13 to confirm that plaintiff pleaded the circumstances surrounding an
alleged fraudulent transfer under Illinois state law with snfficient particulari ty to satisfy Rule
9(b)); Kipperman v. Onex Corp., No. l:05-CV-1242- JOF, 2007 WL 2 872463, at *7 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 26, 2007) ("Although it arises in the context of federal joinder, this court agrees
with the Seventh Circuit that Form 13 provides a good indication of what one must plead in
a fraudulent conveyance claim under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to satisfy the pur
poses of Rule 9(b). "); Sharp v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. (In re Commercial Fin.
Servs., Inc.), 322 B.R. 440, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2003) (citing Form 13 as illustrating the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's fraud complaint); Nielsen v. Mitchell, No. S 85-572, 19 86 WL
31577 at *72 (N.D. Ind. May 5, 19 86) ("Official Form 13, which is expressly declared snffi
cient by Rule 84, presents a model for pleading fraud . . . . Thus, very deferential review of a
complaint is appropriate on a Rule 9(b) motion. ").
92 United States v. Bame, 77 8 F. Supp. 2d 9 8 8, 991 (D. Minn. 2011).
93
See, e. g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Bank of the Ozarks, No. 4:11CV002 80JLH, 2011 WL 3444063, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 8, 2011).
94
Kelleher v. Kelleher, No. 13-cv-05450-ME J, 2014 WL 94197 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014).
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der Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the Court declines to hold that a claim sufficient to
complete Form 2 1 satisfies Rule 9(b) as a matter of law.95
Here we see the beginnings of the tension between the forms and the plausibil
ity pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal, a tension that- as we will see
below- persisted and became a source of concern for the mlemakers.

2.

Patent Claims

Unlike claims of fraud, patent claims are not subject to a particularized
pleading requirement but rather fall within the ordinary pleading standard of
Rule 8(a). Nevertheless, the Official Forms offered a form dedicated to the
pleading of patent infringement claims and have done so from the beginning.
What began as Form 1 6 became Form 1 8 after the 2007 restyling of the Federal
Rules. Both before and after the restyling the form was cited to support the suf
ficiency of patent claims. R2 Technology, Inc. v. Intelligent Systems Software,
Inc. 96 exemplifies the use of Form 1 6 prior to 2007: "[T]he Rule 8 standard
does not change in an action for patent infringement. Indeed, it is apparent from
the form patent infringement complaint that a complaint need only identify the
97
patent, not the specific claims, being asserted." Other instances of such use
98
abound.
What is more interesting, however, is how Form 1 8 has been regarded by
lower courts since the Twombly and Iqbal decisions called into doubt the deId. at *6 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. A & M Dev., LLC, No.
1: l l-cv-00336-BLW, 2012 WL 1 8 83460, at *3 (D. Idaho May 21, 2012) ("By its own terms,
Form 21 is designed to illustrate a 'Claim . . . to Set Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance. . . .
Moreover, the advisory committee notes following Rule 84 suggest that the purpose of
providing the Forms was to prevent litigants from having to guess the meaning of the lan
guage of Rule 8 regarding the form of the complaint. The Court can find no controlling au
thority indicating that the Forms were intended to address the heightened pleading standard
set forth in Rule 9(b). ").
96
R2 Tech., Inc. v. Intelligent Sys. Software, Inc., No. 02-472-GMS, 2002 WL 31260049
(D. Del. Oct. 9, 2002).
97 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
98
See, e. g., Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Ltd., No. C-06-0162 MMC, 2006 WL
123314 8, at * l (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2006) ("Here, Nichia's allegation that Creative Defendants
are infringing Nichia's patents by selling consumer products containing a specific type of
LED, the '902 series' manufactured by SSC, is at least as specific, if not more so, than [the
description of the patented invention in Form 16], and, consequently, is sufficient for pur
poses of Rule 8(a). "); OKI Elec. Indus. Co. v. LG Semicon Co., No. CIV. 97-20310-SW,
199 8 WL 101737, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 199 8) ("No allegation that infringing devices
were made, used, or sold in, or imported into the United States is contained in Form 16, and
yet the Form is 'sufficient under the rules.' Form 16 thus makes it clear that an explicit alle
gation of infringement in the United States is not necessary. " (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 84));
Ergobilt, Inc. v. Neutral Posture Ergonomics, Inc., No. CA3-77-CV-254 8-R, 199 8 WL
4 83626, at * l (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 199 8) ("Because the allegations in NPE's patent in
fringement counterclaim conform to the Official Forrn, they withstand ErgoBilt's motion to
dismiss. "); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 94 8, 960 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (stating
that "[t]he Federal Rules do not require that the plaintiff plead with particulari ty the specific
patent claims that have been infringed . . . . ").
95
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gree of simplicity with which one could ar ticulate claims in a complaint. A
multitude of cour ts have continued to affirm that, given Rule 84's proclamation
that Form 18 is sufficient, they are bound to find that patent claims that comply
99
with the form can withstand a motion to dismiss for f ailure to state a claim. In
doing so, many have noted the tension between Twiqbal and Form 18 explicitly
before proceeding to affirm the sufficiency of Form 18-compliant complaints.
For example, in Intravisual Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics America Inc., the
cour t wrote:
[T]he pleading requirement set forth in Twombly and Iqbal do not require a pa
tentee to specifically identify where in the United States the accused products
are made or n ame an individu al who has purchased, at tempted to purchase, used,
or imported one of the accused products in the United States . . . . A patent in
fringement complaint that pleads at least the facts in Form 18 must be sufficient
to state a claim under Rule 8(a ) because to hold othe rwise would render Fede ral
Rule of Civil Procedure 84 a nullity. 100
The cour t reached this conclusion in par t based on the fact that after Twombly
was decided, the Federal Circuit affirmed the sufficiency of the patent form in
101
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., although without acknowledgement or exten
sive analysis of the tension between the form and Twombly's plausibility stand
102
ard. A more definitive affirmation of the authoritativeness of Form 18 came
later in In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing System Patent Litiga
10
tion, 3 in which the Federal Circuit declared, "to the extent the par ties argue
that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the Forms and create differing
4
pleadings re quirements, the Forms control. " 10 A multitude of other cour ts have
expressed the view that Form 18 remains controlling notwithstanding Twiq-

99
See, e. g., Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C-11-01548 CW, 2011 WL 2149085
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (evaluating a challenged patent claim against the elements found
in Form 18) ; Intravisual Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics Am. Inc., No. 2:10- CV-90-TJW,
2011 WL 1004873, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011) ("This Court has held that so long as a
complaint complies with Form 18 in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, its claims for direct and indirect patent i nfringement will survive a motion to
dismiss.").
100
Intravisual, 2011 WL 1004873, at *3.
101
Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Co rp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
102
It is wo rth noting that in McZeal, there was a dissent by Judge Dyk in which he quarreled
with the fact that Rule 84 would obligate compliant allegations to be approved notwithstand 
ing their failure to provide sufficient notice and argued t hat patent claims under the so-called
"doctrine of equivalents" should not be treated as being covered by the official patent form.
Id. at 1361. Freed from the official for m, Judge Dyk would have applied Twombly to rule
that the statement of the patent claim in McZeal was insufficient. Id. at 1363 (Dyk, J., con 
cur ring in part and dissenting in p art).
103
In re Bill of Lading Trans mission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
104
Id. at 1334.
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As we will see below, however, dissenting views have recently
emerged.10 6
bal.

C. Pleading Jurisdiction

Beyond illustrating the standard for stating claims, the forms revealed the
simplicity with which one may plead jurisdiction. This occurred in Form 7,
merely requiring-for diversity jurisdiction-the statement of the citizenship of
the parties and an affirmation that the amount in controversy exceeds the re
quired value.10 7 Alleging jurisdiction under a federal statute is even simpler: the
allegation need only state "this action arises under," followed by a citation to
8
the relevant constitutional provision, treaty, or federal statute at issue.1 0
Thus, courts have cited to Form 7 to reject urgings to impose more strin
9
gent pleading requirements on jurisdictional allegations.1 0 The court's state
1 10
ment in Karazanos v. Madison Two Associates is illustrative:
105
See, e. g., e-LYNXX Corp. v. InnerWorkings, Inc., No. l-10-cv-02535, 2011 WL
3608642, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2011) ("Since the Federal Rules cannot be changed by a
j udicial decision, Form 18 must necessarily demonstrate an acceptable way of stating a claim
for direct infringement."); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d
667, 675 (E.D. Va. 2011) ("It is difficult to reconcile the pleading standards set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal with the legally conclusive form of pleading found in Form 18.Howev
er, the Court agrees with the post-Twombly holding in McZeal that a litigant who complies
with the provisions of Form 18 has sufficiently stated a claim for direct infringement as con
templated by Rule 12(b)(6)."); Petersen Indus., Inc. v. Hol-Mac Corp., No. 4:10-cv-152CWR-FKB, 2011 WL 577377, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 9, 2011) ("Despite pre-dating
Twombly, the logic of McZeal still stands."); Microsoft Corp.v. Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 741
F. Supp. 2d 1156 ( C.D. Cal. 2010) ("Some district courts have concluded similarly that
while the Court otherwise must apply the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal to pa
tent claims and counterclaims, for allegations of direct infringement, pleading in conform
ance with Form 18 is snfficient."); Realtime Data, LL C v.Stanley, 721 F.Supp. 2d 538, 542
(E.D.Tex. 2010) ("The Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have not affected
the adequacy of complying with Form 18. To hold otherwise would render Rule 84 and
Form 18 invalid, which cannot be done by j udicial action "); see also Richard A.Kamprath,
Article, Patent Pleading Standards After Iqbal: Applying Infringement Contention as a
Guide, 13 SMU Ser.& TECH.L.REv.301, 312 (2010) (noting that Rule 84 requires courts to
accept as sufficient any pleading made in conformance with the forms and that Form 18 can
still be used to plead patent infringement cases even though the form may appear to be in
congruent with Twombly and Iqbal).
106
See infra Part IV; see also, e. g., Wistron Corp.v. Phillip M.Adams & Assocs., No. C10-4458 EM C, 2011 WL 4079231 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss
notwithstanding compliance with Form 18).
107
FED.R. Crv.P.Form 7.
108
Id. But see Gay v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 681, 685 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (finding no re
quirement to plead specific section of a statute notwithstanding the inclusion of such cita
tions in Form 7).
109
See, e. g., Mechler v. United States, No. 12-1183-EFM-GLR, 2012 WL 5289627, at *2
n.20 (D.Kan.Oct.23, 2012) C[A]s shown in Form 7 of the Appendix of Forms of the Fed
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, a statement of jurisdiction based on a specifically identified
federal statute may be adequate to plead federal question jurisdiction.").
1 1° Karazanos v.Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624 (7th Cir.1998).
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We must therefore decide whether the hypothetical possibility that one of
the "foreign citizen [s ]" may be a pe rmanent resident alien in Illinois is enough to
render Madison Two's jurisdiction al allegations defective. In order to reach that
conclusion, we would have to hold that the pa rty seeking fede ral jurisdiction
(here, the defendant, because the context is removal) must not only allege that
certain p arties are foreign citizens or subjects, but must also allege that they are
not per manent residents of the United States. Nothing in the Appendix of Forms
to the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure supports imposing this kind of pleading
burden, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 84, Form 2. . . . Typically the party seeking jurisdiction
pleads the jurisdictional facts required-A is a citizen of Idaho, the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000, B is a citizen of F rance-and it is up to the pa rty
opposing fede ral jurisdiction to contest the facts as pleaded. 111
Since Twombly and Iqbal, Form 7 has been read as consistent with the standard
imposed by those cases, since the form offers facts that form the basis for the
2
plaintiff's asser tion of diversity jurisdiction. 1 1
To take another example, the forms make clear that Rule 8(a)'s admonition
to offer "a shor t and plain statement of the grounds upon which the cour t's ju
risdiction depends " does not refer to personal jurisdiction but rather only sub
ject mat ter jurisdiction: "Any doubt that the term 'jurisdiction' in this context
refers to subject mat ter rather than personal jurisdiction can be resolved by ref
erence to Form 2 [now Form 7] of the Rules, which speaks only of subject mat
ter jurisdiction. " 113 In Dunlop-McCullen v. Pascarella, a third-p arty defendant
sought summary judgment on the ground that the third-p arty plaintiffs f ailed to
4
allege jurisdiction at all in their third-par ty complaints. 1 1 The cour t rejected the
challenge by stating, "It is instructive that Form 22-A [now Form 16] attached
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is a model for third-p arty com
plaints, does not include a jurisdictional statement. " 1 1 5
D. Other Uses
In addition to providing guidance on pleading jurisdiction and claims, the
Appendix of Forms also contained illustrations of how litigants should craft
their answers to complaints. Former Form 21 (now par t of Form 30) backed up
Id. at 627-28 ; see also, e. g., J. E. Sieben Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Davenport, 494 F.
Supp. 1035, 1036 ( S.D. Iowa 1980) ("Defendant city of Davenport seeks dis missal of the
complaint for lack of subject matter juris diction, asserting that plaintiff has not pleaded suf 
ficient facts to coufer diversity jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1332. The court does not
agree. The amended complaint is in con for mity with [Form 2 ] which, by ope ration of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 84, is sufficient.").
112
Har ris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2012) ( "In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
the Supreme Court reiterated that a complaint must include more t han just conclusory allega 
tions to survive a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss. . . . Form 7 (a) re quires more tharl just a
recitation of the legal conclusion t hat the parties are diverse. It re quires the asse rtion of facts
regarding the location of a pa rty's p rincipal place of business.").
113
Stirling Homex Co rp. v. Homosote Co., 437 F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1971).
114
No. 97-Civ.-0195 (PKL) (DFE), 2002 WL 31521012, at *22 ( S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2002).
115
Id. at *23 n.45.
111

1132

NEVADA I.AW JOURNAL

[ Vol. 15:1113

the straightforward proposition in Rule 8(b) that all allegations must be admit
6
ted or denied, including jurisdictional allegations. 1 1 Thus, when the defendant
in McKinney v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange responded to a jurisdictional al
legation by stating, " Defendant admits that Plaintiff purpor ts to bring this ac
tion pursuant to Title VII and the claimed jurisdiction, but denies any implica
tion that said statute has been violated or that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief,"
the cour t cited former Form 21 to reject the response:
Both this Court and McKinney are entitled to know whether Exchange and its
counsel see any jurisdictional flaw lurking in the Complaint. . . . There seems to
be no reason whatever that Exchange should not simply admit the jurisdictional
allegations (see, e.g., Form 2 1 in the Appendix of Forms following the Feder al
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 84 of which places an offici al imprimatur on
such forms ). 117
Recourse to the forms has also been a component of the debate regarding
the applicability of the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal to the plead
ing of affirmative defenses, though by no means did such usage begin only af
8
ter those cases. 1 1 As litigants and cour ts have argued over whether affirmative
defense allegations must meet the Twiqbal standard, Form 30's example has
been interpreted by both sides as suppor ting their respective positions. The
cour t in Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co. succinctly states the view of
those who see Form 30 as confirmation of a slight pleading burden: "[A]s the
undetailed recitations of affirmative defenses illustrated in Form 30 show, [it] is
not an exacting standard even remotely approaching the type of notice re quired
9
of a claim under Twombly and lqbal. "1 1 On the other side, the cour t in Ham
mer v. Peninsula Poultry Equipment Co. has read Form 30 as indicative of a
f act-pleading re quirement for affirmative defenses: "a proper affirmative de
fense, as illustrated in Form 30, includes 'not only the name of the affirmative
116
FED. R. Crv. P. Form 21 (2006) (stating that "Defendant admits the allegations stated in
parag raph l," which referred to the allegation of juris diction in former Form 8).
117
McKinney v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., No. 95-C-6560, 1996 WL 31181, at * l (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 24, 1996) ; see also, e. g., Morgan v. St ringer, No. 96-C-1107, 1996 WL 180074, at * l
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1996) ("It is not the province of any pleader to decline t o respond t o an
allegation based on the pleader's own opinion as to the prop riety of that allegation--whether
by characte rizing it as 'stat [ing ] a legal conclusion' or o the rwise. Indeed, that type of self 
help is especially i napprop riate here, for the official Appendix of Forms that follows the
Rules (see Rule 84) e xpressly contemplates a defendant's admission of a complaint's juris 
dictio nal allegation (see Form 2 1 in that Appendix).").
118
See, e. g., Donald K. Bje lke, Pleading: Raising Defense of Limitations: California and
Federal Practice Compared, 43 CAL. L. REV. 724, 725-26 (1955) (citing Form 20 as a guide
to how to plead a limitations defense sufficiently).
119
Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ; see also,
e. g., Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) ( "The forms appended to the rules
bolster the Court's analysis t hat rule 8 ( b) does not require defendants to provide factual alle 
gations suppo rting defenses.") ; Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1051 (D. Minn. 2010) C[N ]othing in the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or in
the Appendix of Forms even hints that a defendant must plead sufficient facts to establish the
'plausibility' of an affir mative defense.").
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defense, but also facts in support of it.' "1 20 Reading Form 30 in this way has
been particularly more prominent in light of Twombly and Iqbal, given the
seeming incongruity (in the view of these courts) of requiring plaintiffs to plead
2
more detail than defendants would have to offer in response.1 1 The debate is
1 22
ongoing, with sound arguments being offered on both sides.
Finally, the forms have served various other miscellaneous functions, such
as illustrating the appropriate contents of a request to waive formal service of
process, 1 23 emphasizing the need for pleadings to be short and plain rather than
prolix, 124 and buttressing the requirement of formal written consent to the au
thority of a magistrate judge.125
IV. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE FORMS

Notwithstanding this long tradition of invoking the forms at all levels of
the federal judici ary, there have been two distinct challenges to the forms in the
past decade. The first is judicial questioning of the Official Forms in the wake
of Twombly and Iqbal. The second is the impending 2015 abrogation of Rule
84 and the abolition of the forms altogether. Both of these challenges are dis
cussed below.
A. Judicial Questioning of the Forms

Several courts have pushed back against the forms in light of the tension
between their admonitions and the seemingly conflicting interpretations of the

120

Hammer v.Peninsula Poultry Equip. Co., No. RDB-12-1139, 2013 WL 97398, at *5 (D.
Md. Jan. 8, 2013); see also Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No.DK C 11-2416,
2011 WL 5118325 (D.Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (finding that Form 30 does require compliance
with Twombly).
121
See, e. g., Hayne v.Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D.647, 650 (D.Kan. 2009). ("In this
case, the Court agrees with the reasoning of the courts applying the heightened pleading
standard to affirmative defenses.It makes no sense to find that a heightened pleading stand
ard applies to claims but not to affirmative defenses.").
122
See generally Stephen Mayer, Note, An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses,
112 MICH.L. REv. 275 (2013) (discussing the arguments offered by each side in support of
its position respecting the applicability of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses).
123
See, e. g., AIRFX.com v. AirFX LL C, No. CV-11-01064, 2011 WL 5007919, at *5 (D.
Ariz.Oct.20, 2011):
Defendant first contends that plaintiffs' failure to include an expected return date on the waiver
form constitutes non-compliance. . . . Notably, nowhere in Form 6 is there a place to fill in a re
quired return date. Plaintiffs' waiver of service form copied the language of Form 6 exactly.
Therefore, the absence of a return date on the waiver form did not constitute noncompliance
with Rule 4(d)(l)(F).
124
See, e. g., Raiser v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 13-2925 RGK (RZ), 2014 WL 794786,
at *3 ( C.D. Cal.Feb. 26, 2014) (referring the plaintiff to the Appendix of Forms for an un
derstanding of what "short and plain " means in pleadings in light of the plaintiff's excessive
ly lengthy and uninformative complaint).
125
Hajek v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.1999) (Magistrate con
sent).
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Federal Rules from the Supreme Court in Twombly and lqbal. 2 This has been
27
28
most pronounced in the patent context. 1 In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 1
Judge Dyk-concurring in part and dissenting in part- challenged the suffi
ciency of the patent claim form, Form 1 6 (now Form 1 8), when he wrote:
In my view, a bare allegation of literal infringement using the form is inad
equate to provide sufficient notice to an accused infringer under a theory of lit
eral infringement. The form fails to state which claims are asserted and which
features of the accused device are alleged to infringe the limitations of those
claims. In alleging that the "electric motors embod[y] the patented invention"
the form fails to recognize that a patent is only infringed when the accused
product satisfies all of the limitations of the claims. However, I agree that under
Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we would be required to find
that a bare allegation of literal infringement in accordance with Form 16 would
be sufficient under Rule 8 to state a claim. One can only hope that the mlemak
ing process will eventually result in eliminating the form, or at least in revising it
to require allegations specifying which claims are infringed, and the features of
the accused device that correspond to the claim limitations.129
After Judge Dyk's opening salvo against the patent form, other courts be
gan to challenge the sufficiency of Form 18 in various ways. Some dismissed
the form as not designed for more sophisticated design patents and as outdated,
having been drafted prior to the Twiqbal decisions. 130 More common has been
the judicial cabining of Form 1 8 to its strict terms as an exemplar of pleading
direct infringement claims only, rather than indirect claims, thereby relieving
those courts of the obligation to treat the form as sufficient. 131 Not all courts
2
have agreed, thus creating a split on the matter. 13
126
See, e. g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "Iqbal conflicts with the form complaints approved by the Supreme
Court and Congress as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "); Fink v. Burlington
Coat Factory of Florida, LLC, No. 13-62316-CIV, 2014 WL 215 8416, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May
23, 2014) C[A] tension exists between the sparse assertions found in Form 11 and the more
stringent requirements of Twomby and Iqbal.").
127
See, e. g., In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 6 81 F.3d
1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing continuing vitality of Form 1 8- the patent form
after Twombly and Iqbal).
128
Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
129
Id. at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130
See, e. g., Colida v. Nokia, Inc., 347 Fed. App'x 56 8, 571 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Form 1 8
is a sample pleading for patent infringement, but is not tailored to design patents and was last
updated before the Supreme Court's Iqbal decision. ").
131
See, e. g., Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C-09-01531-RS, 2009 WL
2972374, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) ("Both types of indirect infringement include ad
ditional elements, none of which Form 1 8 even purports to address. In the absence of any
other form that addresses indirect infringement and is made binding on the courts through
Rule 84, the Court must apply the teachings of Twombly and Iqbal."); see also, e. g.,
e-LYNXX Corp. v. InnerWorkings, Inc., 2011 WL 360 8642 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that
Form 1 8 is insufficient for indirect infringement claims); Weyer v. MySpace, Inc., No. 2:10cv-00499-MRP-FFMx, 2010 WL 8445305, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) (same); Tech.
Licensing Corp. v. Techuicolor USA, Inc., No. CIV-2:03-1329-WBS-EFB, 2010 WL
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Outside of the patent infringement claim context, judges have noted the
seeming incongruity between what Twombly and Iqbal require and the Official
Forms.133 For example, in Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co., the court
held a patent invalidity counterclaim to the Twombly standard, noting that
"[p ]ut simply, the forms purporting to illustrate what level of pleading is re
quired do not reflect the sea change of Twombly and Iqbal. "134 Another ap
proach has been to limit the forms to the simple types of claims they state, with
the plausibility standard requiring more facts in the context of more complex
matters such as those that were at issue in Twombly and Iqbal. This view was
reflected in Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Illinois:
"[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case. In a complex
antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sam
ple complaints in the civil rules' Appendix of Forms may be necessary ...."135
The court in Zimmerman v. Paulsen was more direct in making this point:
Plaintiffs argue that their Complaint is adequate because it comports with
Form 13 contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Appendix of Forms
for a "Claim for Debt and to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances Under Rule
18( b)." The Court finds this argument unpersuasive, however, because Form 13
is for claims alleging intentional fraud, whereas in Count II Plaintiffs are alleg
ing constructive fraud.136
7
In Memory Control Enterprise, LLC v. Edmunds.com, Inc., 13 the court did
not attribute the inapplicability of the forms to the complexity of the matter be
fore it-a patent invalidity claim. Rather, the court simply distinguished be
tween patent infringement claims-to which an Official Form applied-and
patent invalidity claims, which lacked a specific, dedicated form: "[W]hile the
Appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure includes a form for patent
infringement, it includes no such form for patent invalidity. Until such a form is
included, defendants must meet the pleading standard the Supreme Court an
nounced in Twombly and Iqbal. "138 As more courts have given voice to the
clear tension between the plausibility pleading standard of those cases and the

4070208, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010) (same); Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho, No. C091043 JLR, 2009 WL 4432367, at *3 (W.D.Wash.Nov. 27, 2009) (same).
132
See Bluestone Innovations Tex., L.L.C. v.Formosa Epitaxy Inc., No. 2: 10-cv-171-T JW
CE, 2011 WL 4591906, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011) (discussing the split regarding the
appropriate standard for pleading indirect infringement in light of Form 18).
133
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1348 (11th Cir. 2010) (Ryskamp, J.,
dissenting) ("Such a pleading [in Form 11] would likely be considered scant under the
Twombly standard.").
134
Tyco Fire Products LP v. V ictaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 905 (E.D.Pa. 2011).
135
Limestone Dev. Corp. v. V ill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).
136
Zimmerman v.Paulsen, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080-81 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
13 7
Memory Control Enter., LLC v. Edmunds.com, Inc., No. CV 11-7658 PA ( JCx), 2012
WL 681765 (C.D. Cal.Feb. 8, 2012).
138
Id. at *3.
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simplicity of the longstanding forms, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee took
notice, giving it a ground to call for their abolition.13 9
B.

The Abolition of the F onns

In 2013, the Committee on Practice and Procedure published for comment
a proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Official Forms as unnecessary.1 40 After
conducting "informal inquiries" that confirmed their "initial impressions,"14 1
the Advisory Committee offered at least seven reasons to support its conclusion
that the forms were no longer necessary: (1) "Lawyers do not much use these
forms"; 142 (2) "there is little indication that they provide meaningful help to pro
se litigants"; 1 43 (3) "the pleading forms live in tension with recently developing
approaches to general pleading standards"; 1 44 (4) "the amount of work that
would be required to assume full responsibility for maintaining the forms"; 145
(5) the fact that "many alternative sources provide excellent forms"; 1 46 (6) "the
ranges of topics covered by the pleading forms omit many of the categories of
actions that comprise the bulk of today's federal docket,"147 and (7) "[t]he pur
pose of providing illustrations for the rules, although useful when the rules
were adopted, has been fulfilled."148
Although the reasons offered for abolishing the forms are many, none of
them hold up under scrutiny.149 The last of these reasons just mentioned can be
dispensed with easily. In light of the numerous cases reviewed above in which
courts and litigants invoked or relied on the Official Forms as illustrations of
the proper interpretation or application of a Federal Rule, the illustrative func
tion of the forms persists. Indeed, the cases reviewed also rebut the notion that
litigants fail to use the forms; they certainly use them to make arguments about
139

See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes 39-40 (Mar. 22- 23, 2012) ("Questions
about the role of Rule 84 forms arose with the perception that the pleading forms seem in
consistent with the pleading standards described in the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. . . .
There is real concern that pleading forms-especially Form 1 8 for patent infringement cas
es-do not fit with Twombly and Iqbal.. . . Case law suggests that the pleading forms do not
suffice under Rule 8, contrary to the statement in Rule 84. No one would think we should
have Rule 84 if we were starting today. We should disavow it. ").
14
° COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 83, at 275.
141
Id. at 276.
142

Id.
Id.
144
Id.
1 4s Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 329.
143

149
Here I respond to arguments raised in favor of abrogation by the Advisory Committee.
Professor Brooke Coleman, in her piece submitted for this symposium, addresses additional
arguments against abrogating the forms. See Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The
Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15 NEV. L. J. 1093, 1103-09
(2015).
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the Rules and what they require. To the point that litigants do not use the forms
as the model for their pleadings, such is not the purpose of the Official Forms.
As the (now abandoned) "Introductory Statement" announced at the beginning
of the Official Forms prior to 2007, "The following forms are intended for il
lustration only. They are limited in number. No attempt is made to furnish a
manual of forms."1 5 0 Thus, the critique that lawyers and pro se litigants do not
use the forms-which is untrue 1 5 1-and that the forms are not comprehensive
in their coverage are wholly inapt as the forms never purported to be the fill-in
the-blank variety that a litigant would complete and file verbatim, notwith
standing their sufficiency. Similarly, the Committee's argument that other
sources provide litigants with forms for their use is beside the point, since,
again, the Official Forms were not meant to be "a manual of forms." As such,
the workload that the Committee feared having to undertake should it attempt
to update and maintain the Official Forms to make them into such a manual is a
straw man because no such work is necessary. The forms only need to change
to reflect amendments to the Federal Rules they illustrate. More importantly,
those alternative sources of forms do not provide forms that will be authorita
tive vis-a-vis the Federal Rules, thereby failing to make them a sufficient sub
stitute for the Official Forms the Committee wishes to abandon.
That said, what of the argument that as interpretations of the Federal Rules
change, the forms cannot be permitted to remain in tension with such interpre
tations? Ideally, because the forms themselves are authoritative, interpretations
plainly inconsistent with them should be prohibited, meaning the tension is re
solved by voiding the interpretation. However, when the High Court itself is the
promulgator of the errant interpretation, this ideal collapses. Instead, the op
tions are to (1) ignore the forms and allow the interpretation to trump (with the
form serving only as a hortatory reminder of the impropriety of the interpreta
tion); (2) reinterpret the forms as confined to their specific contexts; (3) amend
the forms to bring them in conformity with the deviant interpretation; or (4)
abolish the forms entirely. If it is true that the forms themselves are sufficient
by command of the Federal Rules themselves, then it is wholly illogical for
them to become insufficient by the passage of time or through judicial interpre
tation if the language of the forms is unchanged. Thus, permitting judicial in15

° FED.R. Crv.P.Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006).
The Committee did not attempt to establish the veracity of this claim empirically but of
fered it purely as its own ipse dixit.Indeed, courts have referred pro se plaintiffs to the Offi
cial Forms for guidance in stating their claims. See, e. g., Weymouth v.Ariz.Dept. of Liquor
Licenses & Control, No. CV-12-979-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 4359073, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept.
21, 2012) ("In preparing an amended complaint, the Weymouths [pro se plaintiffs] should
consult Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and the 'Appendix of Forms' referenced therein
...."); Gharbi v.Flagstar, Nos.A-10- CA-382 LY, A-l l- CA-924 LY, 2012 WL 716150, at
*2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2012) ("For examples of how to write a complaint, Plaintiffs [who
were proceeding pro se] should review the form complaints available in the Appendix to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Montano v.Medical Dept. of Solano State Prison, No.
CIV S-07-0800-LKK-EFB-P, 2007 WL 2199044, at * 2 n.4 (E.D. Cal.July 27, 2007) (refer
ring a pro se plaintiff to Form 9 for pleading guidance).
151
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terpretation to trump the forms would be illegitimate, since that would permit
judicial amendment of them rather than amendment through the Rules Enabling
Act process.152 Confining the forms to their context, however, is a permissible
course of action, if not in keeping with their spirit. As illustrative forms, they
indicate how the Federal Rules should be interpreted and applied. Limiting the
form to the specific claim pleaded, for example, demotes them from their illus
trative role to that of being a manual for use by practitioners in the particular
case. But serving merely in such a capacity was never their intended purpose.153
Nevertheless, it would be more appropriate to achieve this end by amending
Rule 84 to announce the limitation-as Florida has done with its form rule 154rather than via judicial cabining.
The most legitimate course of action, then, would have been to amend the
forms to bring them in line with the prevailing interpretation of the Federal
Rules. Although such a course may be objected to by those who disagree with
the Court's novel interpretation of the general pleading standard, one cannot
deny that an amendment to the forms that goes through the full Rules Enabling
Act process is valid and authoritative. True, doing so would memorialize and
embrace the judicial interpretation in question-namely, the pleading standard
set forth in Twombly and Iqbal-dashing hopes of convincing the Court to re
visit and revise its understanding of pleading doctrine. Nevertheless, if the rule
amendment process yields that result after going through all of the various lev
155
els of approval, so be it.
CONCLUSION

As has been shown, the principal function of the Official Forms throughout
their history has been as an authoritative guarantor of a proper interpretation
and application of the Federal Rules. More specifically, the forms have served
as a bulwark against wayward and overly restrictive use of the rules against lit
igants seeking to access the federal courts. At a time when pleadings-based de
cisions are on the rise, litigants need a source of clarity and protection against
such attacks. Unfortunately, in April 2014 the Advisory Committee recom
mended abrogation of Rule 84 and the elimination of most of the Official
152

Fink v. Burlington Coat Factory of Fla., LLC, No. 13-62316-CIV, 2014 WL 215 8416, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2014) ("But after Twombly, courts must walk a fine line between ap
plying the heightened pleading standard of Twombly and Iqbal, while, at the same time, hon
oring the Supreme Court's instruction that the Federal Rules, including Rule 84, not be
amended by 'judicial interpretation.' " (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel
ligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 16 8 (1993))).
153
See FED. R. Crv. P. Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006) ("No attempt is
made to furnish a manual of forms. ").
154
See FLA. R. Crv. P. l.900(b) ("The . . . forms are sufficient for the matters that are cov
ered by them. ").
155
Professor Coleman, in her piece submitted for this symposium, suggests a more compre
hensive review and updating of the official forms may be necessary. See Coleman, supra
note 149, at 1109-11.
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Forms-save Forms 5 and 6, which pertain to waiver of service of process.1 5 6
Then, in May 2014 the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure-which is referred to as the Standing Committee-unanimously
approved the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms.1 57 The full Judicial
Conference approved the amendments in September 2014 1 58 and the Supreme
Court approved them in April 2015.1 59 Because Congress is unlikely to veto the
amendments, 1 60 it appears that abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms is a fore
gone conclusion.
Such an outcome is lamentable. Absent the forms, there will be little to
hinder full application of plausibility pleading to the full range of allegations
found within all complaints, requiring a level of factual detail not supported by
the forms but purportedly mandated by plausibility. Litigants will have no
source for challenging this move and courts may lack a foundation for resisting
urgings to move in such a direction. Finally, in losing Rule 84 and the forms we
will lose a source that expounds and exemplifies the simplified vision of the
Federal Rules. Rule 84 unashamedly declares that the vision of the Rules is to
produce a civil litigation process in the federal courts that is simple, and that
pleading and other filings should be simple and brief, qualities that facilitate
litigant access to justice. Abrogating Rule 84 may be symbolic (or symptomat
ic) of an attempt to depart from that liberal vision in this "fourth era" of civil
procedure. Let us hope that is not so.

156

See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 10 (2014), available at
http://www.cclfirm.com/files/Report_050914.pdf ("At the April meeting of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, the Advisory Committee unanimously approved the recommen
dations of the Duke Subcommittee, the Discovery Subcommittee, and the Rule 84 Subcom
mittee that certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be adopted. "); see
also Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes (Apr. 10-11, 2014).
157
Moore, supra note 4 ("The Standing Committee met on May 29-30, 2014 in D. C. and
unanimously approved the amendments as they were modified by the Advisory Committee
at its meeting in April. ").
158
David Sellers, Judicial Conference Receives Budget Update, Forwards Rules Package to
Supreme Court, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/09/16
/judicial-conference-receives-budget-update-forwards-rules-package-supreme-court.
159
Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (April 29, 2015), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv l 5(update)_1 823. pelf.
16
° Congress would have to enact legislation blocking the proposed rule changes, which is
unlikely given the House of Representatives is controlled by Republicans, who likely would
support abrogation of the forms.
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